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The reliance of European states on gas imports from Russia has been one of the key underlying factors
shaping the EU’s response to the Ukraine crisis. However could the use of shale gas help to reduce
the EU’s energy dependence on Russia? Corey Johnson assesses the varying policy responses in
European countries, noting that while some states such as Poland have been vocal in their support
for shale gas, it is unlikely to enable a significant shift away from Russian gas in the short-term.
The Ukraine crisis has laid bare both the EU’s lack of a coherent energy policy and the unsavoury
politics of Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas. My travels through Moldova and Ukraine
last spring, as well as past work in Poland, Russia, and Azerbaijan, confirmed for me that these
would have been interesting times in shaping the future of natural gas markets in Europe even if the last ten months’
dramatic events in Ukraine had not occurred. Given all that has happened – Russia’s occupation of Crimea, ongoing
strife in eastern Ukraine, and the crash of flight MH17 – more fundamental shifts in Europe’s energy landscape are
possible, including the widespread embrace of domestic sources of untapped unconventional hydrocarbons,
including shale gas, but such a shift appears unlikely.
Europe’s changing energy landscape
In 2013 Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to move forward with the construction of a South Stream pipeline
under the Black Sea in spite of a competing project to move gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field to European
markets via Turkey and a newly constructed Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) also moving forward. This bold – some
might say foolhardy – move raised questions in many observers’ minds of where all of this gas would be burned and,
more importantly, at what price it could be sold.
Figure 1: Proposed route of the South Stream pipeline
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Meanwhile, the completion of the second parallel line of the Nord Stream pipeline linking Russia and Germany
under the Baltic Sea further locked in not just Germany, but also the Netherlands and several other EU member
states into deliveries of Russian gas – and why not? Russia had proven a reliable supplier to non-Warsaw Pact
countries since the depths of the Cold War. The Soviet Union had been reliable for much the same reason Russia
continued the streak: it needed the cash. Yet, and quite by design, Nord Stream and South Stream were designed to
bypass other states that had depended on Russian energy for even longer, notably Belarus and Ukraine, while the
new Azerbaijan gas transit links opted for a cheaper alternative via the Adriatic to Italy over the EU’s favoured
Southern Corridor pipeline, Nabucco, which would have passed through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary (all
heavily dependent on Gazprom gas) en route to Austria.
Figure 2: Existing gas pipelines from Russia to Europe
Note: Image created by Dr A Judge (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
As my colleague Tim Boersma and I have argued, even the dramatic Russian invasion of Crimea last spring and
events in eastern Ukraine did little to change the underlying reality of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. In
short, the EU and its member states, who carry the primary responsibility for developing and implementing energy
policies, simply do not have the appetite for the economic and political upheavals a coordinated embargo of Russian
energy would cause. Nor is it in anyone’s interest to have Russia – a nuclear power with serious imperial baggage
and the largest country in the world – unable to sell its hydrocarbons, an important fact that is often ignored amid
retributive blustering. The shooting down of MH17 in eastern Ukraine, an act that killed 200 Dutch nationals, has
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caused the Netherlands to reassess its cosy relations with the Kremlin, but whether the country is willing to take any
serious steps that jeopardise the health of its economy remains to be seen.
Enter shale gas
It is little surprise, given the albatross around Europe’s neck of continued dependence on Russia, that yet untapped
domestic sources of gas have been touted by some strategists, including the European Council itself, as a way to
increase energy security. Because energy policy is still a core competency of the member states, not the EU, there
is a wide range of approaches to shale gas among states.
The United Kingdom comes closest to commercial-scale production of shale gas using hydraulic fracturing, but as
Nick Riley, former head of Unconventional Gas at the British Geological Society, recently pointed out, there has not
been a well fracked for gas in the UK since 2011, largely owing to political opposition and a slow rollout of
government regulations on well integrity and chemical use. The current UK government, adamantly pro-fracking
though it may be, is realising that in spite of attempts to bribe local governments with generous cash payouts on a
per-well basis if they too embrace fracking, resistance in local jurisdictions is formidable.
France’s outright ban on using hydraulic fracturing to extract gas and oil reflects both public scepticism toward the
technologies used, the specific circumstances of France’s very high percentage of nuclear power in its energy mix,
as well as the nuclear industry’s influence in domestic politics. Germany and the Netherlands have in place softer
moratoria on shale gas, ones that essentially adhere to the precautionary principle and put the burden on exploration
companies to prove that the environmental impacts of fracking are minimal.
Romania and Bulgaria, with 1,444 and 481 billion cubic metres (bcm) respectively of technically recoverable shale
gas, would seem natural candidates for shale gas development given both countries’ dependence on Russian
imports, but public opposition to fracking remains high in both countries, and a ban on fracking in Bulgaria led US
energy giant Chevron to pull out its operations before it had made any headway in exploration. Romania’s
government is currently more positively disposed toward fracking, but not much has happened on the ground. While
there have been widespread allegations of Gazprom attempting to manipulate public opinion against shale gas in
Southeastern Europe, my own impression having talked to people there is that the enemy you know (Gazprom) is
better than the enemy you don’t know, especially when the unknown also potentially carries risks to groundwater
supplies and the landscape. Given the slick, well-funded pro-fracking media campaigns of the big players, it also
seems too easy to blame a Gazprom conspiracy for being able to orchestrate public opinion against fracking.
Poland has been the EU member state most enthusiastic about exploiting its potential shale gas reserves, which at
over 4,000 bcm are also Europe’s largest (Poland currently uses about 18 bcm of gas per year, nearly all of which is
imported from Russia via the Yamal pipeline). As we have argued before, and as has been more or less confirmed
in the interim, commercially viable shale gas development in Poland is an uphill prospect at best, despite the giddy
enthusiasm of government officials after estimates of shale potential for the country were released in 2011. Poland
has a history with its bigger neighbours, to put in shorthand what everyone knows, and the warm embrace, literally
and figuratively, between Russia and Germany, Putin and especially former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (now of
Nord Stream AG) was viewed by many in Poland as yet another betrayal in a long history of long-distance
handshakes across Polish territory. The US government, always eager to help Poland and even more eager to
promote its companies abroad, expected a double bonus: spiting the Kremlin-Gazprom nexus while helping to
further enrich job creating enterprises such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, and other smaller home-grown energy
companies.
The enthusiasm has since been dampened by several realities. Geologically, Poland is not Pennsylvania, and
several big players (ExxonMobil, Marathon, Talisman) have pulled out of the country in part because of
disappointing test well results. In terms of experience with making oil and gas companies happy with taxation
regimes and pro-business regulations, Poland is not Texas, and industry representatives complained of not knowing
who was in charge and who in the government, below the rhetorical enthusiasm for domestic shale gas, was
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actually willing to invest the political capital to make conditions ripe for development.
Also worth mentioning is that in Texas landowners stand to profit handsomely from an ugly drilling rig being plopped
down on their property, which may help to explain why there are an estimated 1,200 gas wells within the city limits of
Fort Worth, Texas. Not so in Poland, where subsurface mineral rights belong to the state. There is also the not
insignificant matter of Poland being in the EU. While the EU maintains an official position of neutrality regarding
member states’ energy mix, recent years have seen a number of interventions relevant to shale gas, including the
Commission’s January 2014 Recommendation 2014/70/EU that encouraged members to conduct environmental
impact assessments, baseline reports on water and air quality, and public disclosure, as well as a host of other
steps. This recommendation signals to member states that these are the areas in which the Commission is
considering legislative proposals on shale gas and fracking in the next year or so. It is also on top of the nineteen EU
environmental quality directives already on the books that potentially apply to fracking, ranging from habitats to
biocidal products, on which the Commission could seek to regulate fracking in Poland and elsewhere.
While the oil and gas industry, and even some governments such as those in the UK and Poland, may lament
Europe’s extensive environmental regulations, my sense is that the higher bar to fracking than in most of the US
reflects European attitudes toward tampering with natural systems and this higher bar will not be lowered in spite of
worries about energy security. There is no single explanation for this. Yes, the EU is more densely populated than
the US, but rural Poland is not more densely populated than Fort Worth. Yes, places like Texas and Oklahoma are
more accustomed to hydrocarbon extraction than some areas of Europe, but North Carolina has virtually no history
with oil and gas, yet is moving forward at breakneck speed with liberalised rules for shale gas development.
To the question of whether the Ukraine crisis will change any of the basic calculus on shale gas in the EU, assuming
some sort of normalcy returns to eastern Ukraine, and Russia delivers precious gas to its wealthy customers in
Austria and Germany as it has for four decades, then the current sense of urgency about shale gas will likely pass.
The EU will tout its liberalised markets and better interconnections that will allow for cross-border movements of
energy, while improved liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity (including in Poland) will lessen the perceived threat
that Russia poses. In response to events in Ukraine, the Netherlands and Germany have very publicly put supplier
diversity high on the agenda, with the Dutch looking to import American LNG and Chancellor Merkel giving her
blessing to German energy giant E.ON searching for LNG suppliers in Canada, Peru, Mozambique, and the Eastern
Mediterranean. As for shale gas, though, no country can “will” gas out of the ground, and companies must make the
numbers work before exploiting a resource. This appears to be a long-term bet at best.
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